

<i>Return</i>		
Case No.:	Date and time warrant executed:	Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
2-18-MJ-01713	7/2/2018 3:00pm	ERIC A. Puritsky
Inventory made in the presence of: <u>John D. Verrastro</u>		
Inventory of the property taken and name of any person(s) seized: [Please provide a description that would be sufficient to demonstrate that the items seized fall within the items authorized to be seized pursuant to the warrant (e.g., type of documents, as opposed to "miscellaneous documents") as well as the approximate volume of any documents seized (e.g., number of boxes). If reference is made to an attached description of property, specify the number of pages to the attachment and any case number appearing thereon.]		
<p>See attachment of property Receipts pages 1-8.</p> <p>There are 8 separate packages of items; however the volume is approximately 3 boxes.</p> <p>On 7/10/18 a review of the digital media collected on 7/2/2018 was completed. 54 documents were seized from the USB 3.0 Thumbdrive. The documents included financial statements and spreadsheets related to Tolane; Documents related to Tolane's tax business; Documents related to a property located at 4611 Placidia Ave., Toluca Lake. See attached Report of logical extraction of documents seized.</p>		
<i>Certification</i> (by officer present during the execution of the warrant)		
<p>I declare under penalty of perjury that I am an officer who executed this warrant and that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge through a filing with the Clerk's Office.</p> <p>Date: <u>7/10/2018</u></p> <p> Executing officer's signature</p> <p><u>John D. Verrastro Special Agent</u> Printed name and title</p>		

ATTACHMENT APROPERTY TO BE SEARCHED

The subject premises is an office (the "SUBJECT OFFICE") associated with Printograph, Inc., doing business as GotPrint.com ("Printograph"), located within 7605 North San Fernando Road in Burbank, California, 91505. It is a large, two-story office building with the number 7605 on the exterior near the entrance. There is a large sign on the exterior of the building with the name GotPrint.com in white letters and a black background. The exterior of the building is white and beige with large exterior windows. The SUBJECT OFFICE is located on the first floor of this building against the exterior windows facing towards North San Fernando Road. The SUBJECT OFFICE is the third door on the right from the interior entrance to the Printograph offices from the building's main lobby. There is no office number on the SUBJECT OFFICE. The SUBJECT OFFICE is rectangular with yellow and brown walls and with large rectangular windows facing inwards that provide a full view of the interior from the hallway. Inside the SUBJECT OFFICE, there is a desk with a computer, multiple monitors, and papers and binders on it. There are multiple filing cabinets against opposing walls. There are boxes on the floor. There is also a table and chairs.

ATTACHMENT B

I. ITEMS TO BE SEIZED

1. The following items are to be seized from the SUBJECT OFFICE, which constitute fruits, evidence, and instrumentalities of criminal violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1957 (money laundering) (collectively, the "SUBJECT OFFENSES"):

a. Any and all documents and records relating to any financial or bank accounts owned or controlled in whole or in part by SHODJA TALAAEE, also known as Sean Edin Talaee ("TALAAEE"), from December 2014 to the present.

b. Any and all documents relating to any financial transactions conducted or caused to be conducted by TALAAEE or companies affiliated with TALAAEE, from December 2014 to the present.

c. Any and all accounting, auditing, or tax documents or records relating to any business or other financial activities of TALAAEE, from December 2014 to the present.

d. Any documents reflecting or relating to the incorporation of, ownership of, or licensing for any business ventures or activities of TALAAEE, from December 2014 to the present.

e. Any and all documents, records, or communications with the Internal Revenue Service, from December 2014 to the present.

f. Any and all documents, records, or communications related to or with actual or potential investors, clients, or

customers of, or lenders to, any business activities or ventures related to TALAAE~~X~~, (to be clear, other than Printograph) from December 2014 to the present.

g. Any and all memoranda of understanding, business contacts, or business agreements, including any debt instruments, entered into by TALAAE or any entity affiliated or associated with TALAAE~~X~~, (to be clear, other than Printograph)

h. Any digital device which is itself or which contains evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of the SUBJECT OFFENSES, and forensic copies thereof.

i. With respect to any digital device containing evidence falling within the scope of the foregoing categories of items to be seized:

i. evidence of who used, owned, or controlled the device at the time the things described in this warrant were created, edited, or deleted, such as logs, registry entries, configuration files, saved usernames and passwords, documents, browsing history, user profiles, e-mail, e-mail contacts, chat and instant messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence;

ii. evidence of the presence or absence of software that would allow others to control the device, such as viruses, Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious software, as well as evidence of the presence or absence of security software designed to detect malicious software;

iii. evidence of the attachment of other devices;

iv. evidence of counter-forensic programs (and associated data) that are designed to eliminate data from the device;

v. evidence of the times the device was used;

vi. passwords, encryption keys, and other access devices that may be necessary to access the device;

vii. applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, or other software, as well as documentation and manuals, that may be necessary to access the device or to conduct a forensic examination of it;

viii. records of or information about Internet Protocol addresses used by the device;

ix. records of or information about the device's Internet activity, including firewall logs, caches, browser history and cookies, "bookmarked" or "favorite" web pages, search terms that the user entered into any Internet search engine, and records of user-typed web addresses.

2. As used herein, the terms "records," "documents," "programs," "applications," and "materials" include records, documents, programs, applications, and materials created, modified, or stored in any form, including in digital form on any digital device and any forensic copies thereof.

3. As used herein, the term "digital device" includes any electronic system or device capable of storing or processing data in digital form, including central processing units; desktop, laptop, notebook, and tablet computers; personal digital assistants; wireless communication devices, such as telephone paging devices, beepers, mobile telephones, and smart phones; digital cameras; gaming consoles (including Sony PlayStations and Microsoft Xboxes); peripheral input/output

devices, such as keyboards, printers, scanners, plotters, monitors, and drives intended for removable media; related communications devices, such as modems, routers, cables, and connections; storage media, such as hard disk drives, floppy disks, memory cards, optical disks, and magnetic tapes used to store digital data (excluding analog tapes such as VHS); and security devices.

II. SEARCH PROCEDURE FOR DIGITAL DEVICES

4. In searching digital devices or forensic copies thereof, law enforcement personnel executing this search warrant will employ the following procedure:

a. Law enforcement personnel or other individuals assisting law enforcement personnel (the "search team") will, in their discretion, either search the digital device(s) on-site or seize and transport the device(s) to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory or similar facility to be searched at that location. The search team shall complete the search as soon as is practicable but not to exceed 120 days from the date of execution of the warrant. The government will not search the digital device(s) beyond this 120-day period without obtaining an extension of time order from the Court.

b. The search team will conduct the search only by using search protocols specifically chosen to identify only the specific items to be seized under this warrant.

i. The search team may subject all of the data contained in each digital device capable of containing any of the items to be seized to the search protocols to determine

whether the device and any data thereon falls within the list of items to be seized. The search team may also search for and attempt to recover deleted, "hidden," or encrypted data to determine, pursuant to the search protocols, whether the data falls within the list of items to be seized.

ii. The search team may use tools to exclude normal operating system files and standard third-party software that do not need to be searched.

iii. The search team may use forensic examination and searching tools, such as "EnCase" and "FTK" (Forensic Tool Kit), which tools may use hashing and other sophisticated techniques.

c. If the search team, while searching a digital device, encounters immediately apparent contraband or other evidence of a crime outside the scope of the items to be seized, the team shall immediately discontinue its search of that device pending further order of the Court and shall make and retain notes detailing how the contraband or other evidence of a crime was encountered, including how it was immediately apparent contraband or evidence of a crime.

d. If the search determines that a digital device does not contain any data falling within the list of items to be seized, the government will, as soon as is practicable, return the device and delete or destroy all forensic copies thereof.

e. If the search determines that a digital device does contain data falling within the list of items to be seized,

the government may make and retain copies of such data, and may access such data at any time.

f. If the search determines that a digital device is (1) itself an item to be seized and/or (2) contains data falling within the list of other items to be seized, the government may retain the digital device and any forensic copies of the digital device, but may not access data falling outside the scope of the other items to be seized (after the time for searching the device has expired) absent further court order.

g. The government may also retain a digital device if the government, prior to the end of the search period, obtains an order from the Court authorizing retention of the device (or while an application for such an order is pending), including in circumstances where the government has not been able to fully search a device because the device or files contained therein is/are encrypted.

h. After the completion of the search of the digital devices, the government shall not access digital data falling outside the scope of the items to be seized absent further order of the Court.

5. In order to search for data capable of being read or interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement personnel are authorized to seize the following items:

a. Any digital device capable of being used to commit, further, or store evidence of the SUBJECT OFFENSES;

- b. Any equipment used to facilitate the transmission, creation, display, encoding, or storage of digital data;
- c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of storing digital data;
- d. Any documentation, operating logs, or reference manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or software used in the digital device;
- e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, or other software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the digital device;
- f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles, or similar physical items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device or data stored on the digital device; and
- g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes, or other information necessary to access the digital device or data stored on the digital device.

6. The special procedures relating to digital devices found in this warrant govern only the search of digital devices pursuant to the authority conferred by this warrant and do not apply to any search of digital devices pursuant to any other court order.

AFFIDAVIT

I, John Verrastro, being duly sworn, declare and state as follows:

I. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT

1. This affidavit is made in support of a warrant to search an office associated with the closely held corporation Printograph, Inc., doing business as GotPrint.com ("Printograph"), located at 7605 North San Fernando Road in Burbank, California, 91050 (the "SUBJECT OFFICE"), and as described fully in Attachment A, which is incorporated herein by reference. The SUBJECT OFFICE was previously occupied by a former employee known to Printograph as SHODJA TALAAEE, also known as Sean Edin Talaee ("TALAAEE"), until Printograph terminated TALAAEE's employment on or about June 20, 2018. The SUBJECT OFFICE contains both personal items belonging to TALAAEE and business items belonging to Printograph.

2. As described more fully below, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of criminal violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1957 (money laundering) (collectively, the "SUBJECT OFFENSES"), as described more fully in Attachment B, will be found in the SUBJECT OFFICE.

3. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon my personal observations, my training and experience, my review of reports drafted by other employees, and information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and witnesses. This

affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested warrant and does not purport to set forth all of my knowledge of or investigation into this matter. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all conversations and statements described in this affidavit are related in substance and in part only.

II. BACKGROUND FOR SPECIAL AGENT JOHN VERRASTRO

4. I am a Special Agent ("SA") of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), United States Department of Justice, in the Los Angeles Field Office and have been so employed since 2004. For the past approximately twelve years, my primary responsibility has been investigating securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and other fraud violations. My experience includes interviewing witnesses, gathering documents, analyzing financial documents, conducting surveillance, and serving grand jury subpoenas. I have also received training in investigating financial crimes, including securities fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. Prior to becoming an FBI agent, I worked for ten years in financial services at a bank and an investment firm. In the course of my FBI employment, I have participated in executing many search warrants of businesses and residences in connection with financial fraud offenses.

5. In investigating fraudulent schemes, I have become familiar with the types of records and documents that individuals and entities use to perpetrate their schemes, and have executed and participated in the execution of search

warrants at homes and businesses of individuals involved in fraudulent schemes.

III. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE

6. Between 2014 and 2018, Printograph employed TALAAE as its Controller of Accounting. TALAAE had access to Printograph's accounting records and could review Printograph's bank account information and activity. Beginning in 2015, TALAAE periodically paid Printograph's "estimated tax" throughout the year rather than paying Printograph's taxes all at once at the end of the year. TALAAE would prepare a check made payable to the United States Treasury and present it to Printograph's president, Sonik Artounian ("Artounian"), for Artounian to sign. TALAAE would then submit the check to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") along with a voucher form requesting that the IRS credit Printograph with the tax payment. On many occasions, however, TALAAE provided his own personal information, including his last name and Social Security Number ("SSN"), in filling out the voucher form, thereby claiming the tax payments for himself, rather than on behalf of Printograph.

7. While he was employed by Printograph, TALAAE worked in the SUBJECT OFFICE. Many of TALAAE's business records, accounting records, and financial documents, as well as unopened mail addressed to TALAAE, remain in the SUBJECT OFFICE.

IV. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

8. Based on conversations with witnesses, victims, and other FBI SAs and my knowledge of the investigation, I know the following:

a. Artounian hired TALAAE near the end of 2014 as the Controller of Accounting for Printograph. In this position, TALAAE had access to Printograph's accounting records and could review Printograph's bank account information and activity, although TALAAE lacked signing authority or wire transfer authority for these accounts.

b. At the time TALAAE was hired, Printograph maintained a bank account in which it would save money to pay the IRS its tax liability at the end of the year. TALAAE recommended to Artounian that Printograph pay installments of its "estimated tax" throughout the year rather than paying its actual tax liability all at once at the end of the year. Artounian agreed, and in 2015 Printograph began a practice of providing periodic payments to the IRS for its "estimated tax" throughout the year. As part of this practice, TALAAE would periodically bring checks to Artounian, who had signing authority for Printograph's bank accounts, to sign so that TALAAE could submit them to the IRS. TALAAE would then fill out a voucher form requesting that the IRS credit Printograph with the payments and then mail the check and the voucher form to the IRS. Artounian's understanding was that TALAAE would use Artounian's last name and SSN in filling out this form so that the vouchers they received would credit Printograph with the tax payments. This practice continued until 2018.

c. In February 2018, Artounian received a letter at her home address from the IRS requesting Artounian's assistance in a pending federal tax matter related to TALAAE. In response

to this letter, Artounian contacted IRS Revenue Agent Melissa A. Clark, whose contact information was included in the letter, and Artounian eventually met with Agent Clark in person. During this meeting, Artounian was provided with limited information about the tax matter involving TALAEE.

d. In June 2018, Artounian received another letter from the IRS. On or about June 20, 2018, Artounian met with Revenue Agent Clark again, as well as Revenue Agent Bernard Trapp, who provided Artounian with further information about the IRS's investigation into TALAEE. Through her conversations with the IRS, Artounian was able to determine that TALAEE was depositing the checks that Artounian had signed but that TALAEE appeared to be claiming some of the tax benefits for himself.

e. Following her discussion with the IRS agents, Artounian accessed Printograph's bank accounts in order to review copies of the checks that TALAEE had deposited with the IRS on behalf of Printograph. Artounian observed that some of these checks listed the first four letters of Artounian's last name and Artounian's SSN on the back of the negotiated checks, but that the back of other checks listed the first four letters of TALAEE's last name and the SSN that Printograph had on file for TALAEE. The checks listing the first four letters of TALAEE's last name and his SSN totaled well over \$2 million.

f. Artounian provided me with copies of checks made payable to the United States Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, that had been negotiated against Printograph. These checks confirm what Artounian told me. The back of some of the checks

listed what Artounian told me was her SSN and the first four letters of Artounian's last name, while others listed TALAAE's SSN as well as the first four letters of TALAAE's last name.

g. On or about June 20, 2018, a Printograph employee contacted Artounian and told Artounian that TALAAE was boxing up documents in the SUBJECT OFFICE. Artounian returned to Printograph's offices and called TALAAE into her office, at which point she terminated TALAAE's employment. TALAAE was not permitted to return to the SUBJECT OFFICE. TALAAE's phone, wallet, and other personal effects were given to him, and he was escorted from the premises.

h. Also on or about June 20, 2018, Artounian contacted the FBI's Public Access Line by telephone to report that Printograph had been the victim of a multimillion-dollar embezzlement committed by TALAAE.

i. Printograph employee Kristina Keshishyan ("Keshishyan") contacted the FBI by telephone on or about June 20, 2018 and provided TALAAE's SSN and other personal identifying information. Keshishyan contacted the FBI by telephone again on or about June 21, 2018 and advised that TALAAE had forged signatures and created fake documents during his employment at Printograph.

j. On June 28, 2018, I spoke with Artounian, Keshishyan, and Printograph's outside counsel, Eric Puritsky ("Puritsky"), by telephone. During this conversation, Puritsky informed me that he had received a letter from TALAAE's attorney

requesting to have TALAAE's property in the SUBJECT OFFICE returned to him.

k. On June 29, 2018, Artounian informed me that she and other Printograph employees had looked through the SUBJECT OFFICE and observed what appeared to be personal bank account information addressed to TALAAE under the name "Sean Talaee."

l. On June 29, 2018, I visited Printograph's offices. Artounian showed me the SUBJECT OFFICE, though I did not search the SUBJECT OFFICE. I took pictures of the SUBJECT OFFICE through the windows in the hall. Inside the SUBJECT OFFICE, I saw documents sitting on a desk and in boxes located on a table and on the floor. I saw filing cabinets against the wall in the SUBJECT OFFICE with what appeared to be unopened mail. Artounian showed me documents on the desk in the SUBJECT OFFICE that appeared to be financial in nature. I also saw envelopes addressed to TALAAE in a notebook on the desk, as well as sealed envelopes addressed from TALAAE to other parties stacked on a filing cabinet.

m. I showed Artounian a photograph from the California Department of Motor Vehicles records for "Sean Edin Talaee," and Artounian identified the man in the photograph as the person who worked in the SUBJECT OFFICE.

V. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON FRAUD OFFENSES

9. Based on my training and experience, I know the following: Individuals engaged in fraudulent schemes often keep the records and documents they use to perpetrate their fraud at their homes and businesses, in their vehicles, and on their

computers and other digital devices. In the normal course of business, hard copies of accounting records are often maintained in the offices of those employees who are responsible for the business's accounting. Business records are often kept for a period of seven years.

VI. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DIGITAL DEVICES

10. As used herein, the term "digital device" includes any electronic system or device capable of storing or processing data in digital form, including central processing units; desktop, laptop, notebook, and tablet computers; personal digital assistants; wireless communication devices, such as telephone paging devices, beepers, mobile telephones, and smart phones; digital cameras; gaming consoles (including Sony PlayStations and Microsoft Xboxes); peripheral input/output devices, such as keyboards, printers, scanners, plotters, monitors, and drives intended for removable media; related communications devices, such as modems, routers, cables, and connections; storage media, such as hard disk drives, floppy disks, memory cards, optical disks, and magnetic tapes used to store digital data (excluding analog tapes such as VHS); and security devices. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, as well as information related to me by agents and others involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I know that data in digital form can be stored on a variety of digital devices and that during the search of a premises it is not always possible to search digital devices for digital data for a number of reasons, including the following:

a. Searching digital devices can be a highly technical process that requires specific expertise and specialized equipment. There are so many types of digital devices and software programs in use today that it is impossible to bring to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment necessary to conduct a thorough search. In addition, it may be necessary to consult with specially trained personnel who have specific expertise in the types of digital devices, operating systems, or software applications that are being searched.

b. Digital data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction. Searching digital devices can require the use of precise, scientific procedures that are designed to maintain the integrity of digital data and to recover "hidden," erased, compressed, encrypted, or password-protected data. As a result, a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory or similar facility, is essential to conducting a complete and accurate analysis of data stored on digital devices.

c. The volume of data stored on many digital devices will typically be so large that it will be highly impractical to search for data during the physical search of the premises. A single megabyte of storage space is the equivalent of 500 double-spaced pages of text. A single gigabyte of storage space, or 1,000 megabytes, is the equivalent of 500,000 double-spaced pages of text. Storage devices capable of storing 500 or more gigabytes are now commonplace. Consequently, just one

device might contain the equivalent of 250 million pages of data, which, if printed out, would completely fill three 35' x 35' x 10' rooms to the ceiling. Further, a 500-gigabyte drive could contain as many as approximately 450 full run movies or 450,000 songs.

d. Electronic files or remnants of such files can be recovered months or even years after they have been downloaded onto a hard drive, deleted, or viewed via the Internet.¹ Electronic files saved to a hard drive can be stored for years with little or no cost. Even when such files have been deleted, they can be recovered months or years later using readily available forensics tools. Normally, when a person deletes a file on a computer, the data contained in the file does not actually disappear; rather, that data remains on the hard drive until it is overwritten by new data. Therefore, deleted files, or remnants of deleted files, may reside in free space or slack space, i.e., space on a hard drive that is not allocated to an active file or that is unused after a file has been allocated to a set block of storage space, for long periods of time before they are overwritten. In addition, a computer's operating system may also keep a record of deleted data in a swap or recovery file. Similarly, files that have been viewed on the Internet are often automatically downloaded into a temporary directory or cache. The browser typically maintains a fixed

¹ These statements do not generally apply to data stored in volatile memory such as random-access memory, or "RAM," which data is, generally speaking, deleted once a device is turned off.

amount of hard drive space devoted to these files, and the files are only overwritten as they are replaced with more recently downloaded or viewed content. Thus, the ability to retrieve residue of an electronic file from a hard drive depends less on when the file was downloaded or viewed than on a particular user's operating system, storage capacity, and computer habits. Recovery of residue of electronic files from a hard drive requires specialized tools and a controlled laboratory environment. Recovery also can require substantial time.

e. Although some of the records called for by this warrant might be found in the form of user-generated documents (such as word processing, picture, and movie files), digital devices can contain other forms of electronic evidence as well. In particular, records of how a digital device has been used, what it has been used for, who has used it, and who has been responsible for creating or maintaining records, documents, programs, applications, and materials contained on the digital devices are, as described further in the attachments, called for by this warrant. Those records will not always be found in digital data that is neatly segregable from the hard drive image as a whole. Digital data on the hard drive not currently associated with any file can provide evidence of a file that was once on the hard drive but has since been deleted or edited, or of a deleted portion of a file (such as a paragraph that has been deleted from a word processing file). Virtual memory paging systems can leave digital data on the hard drive that show what tasks and processes on the computer were recently

used. Web browsers, e-mail programs, and chat programs often store configuration data on the hard drive that can reveal information such as online nicknames and passwords. Operating systems can record additional data, such as the attachment of peripherals, the attachment of USB flash storage devices, and the times the computer was in use. Computer file systems can record data about the dates files were created and the sequence in which they were created. This data can be evidence of a crime, indicate the identity of the user of the digital device, or point toward the existence of evidence in other locations. Recovery of this data requires specialized tools and a controlled laboratory environment, and also can require substantial time.

f. Further, evidence of how a digital device has been used, what it has been used for, and who has used it, may be the absence of particular data on a digital device. For example, to rebut a claim that the owner of a digital device was not responsible for a particular use because the device was being controlled remotely by malicious software, it may be necessary to show that malicious software that allows someone else to control the digital device remotely is not present on the digital device. Evidence of the absence of particular data on a digital device is not segregable from the digital device. Analysis of the digital device as a whole to demonstrate the absence of particular data requires specialized tools and a controlled laboratory environment, and can require substantial time.

g. Digital device users can attempt to conceal data within digital devices through a number of methods, including the use of innocuous or misleading filenames and extensions. For example, files with the extension ".jpg" often are image files; however, a user can easily change the extension to ".txt" to conceal the image and make it appear that the file contains text. Digital device users can also attempt to conceal data by using encryption, which means that a password or device, such as a "dongle" or "keycard," is necessary to decrypt the data into readable form. In addition, digital device users can conceal data within another seemingly unrelated and innocuous file in a process called "steganography." For example, by using steganography a digital device user can conceal text in an image file that cannot be viewed when the image file is opened. Digital devices may also contain "booby traps" that destroy or alter data if certain procedures are not scrupulously followed. A substantial amount of time is necessary to extract and sort through data that is concealed, encrypted, or subject to booby traps, to determine whether it is evidence, contraband, or instrumentalities of a crime. In addition, decryption of devices and data stored thereon is a constantly evolving field, and law enforcement agencies continuously develop or acquire new methods of decryption, even for devices or data that cannot currently be decrypted.

11. Other than what has been described herein, to my knowledge, the United States has not attempted to obtain this data by other means.

VII. CONCLUSION

12. For all the reasons described above, there is probable cause to believe that evidence of violations of the SUBJECT OFFENSES, as described above and in Attachment B of this affidavit, will be found in a search of the SUBJECT OFFICE, as further described above and in Attachment A of this affidavit.

John Verrastro, Special Agent,
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

Subscribed to and sworn before me
this 2nd day of July, 2018.

HONORABLE ALICIA G. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property**

Case ID: 318A-LA-2947290

On (date) 07/02/2018

item (s) listed below were:

- Collected/Seized
- Received From
- Returned To
- Released To

"Room A"
Filing Cabinet

(Name) Printograph Inc. (office)

(Street Address) 7605 N. San Fernando Road

(City) Burbank, CA

Description of Item (s): Blank H&R Block card stock; H&R Block Business card with name Sean Talaei Tax Associate; Mailer post card in the name of "The Talaei Tax Group"; print off of payroll stubs for Shodja Talaei.

Received By: John Venuto
(Signature)

Received From: _____
(Signature)

Printed Name/Title: John Vernastro / Special Agent Printed Name/Title: _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: 318A-LA-2947290

On (date) 7/2/2018

item (s) listed below were:


Collected/Seized
 Received From
 Returned To
 Released To

(Name) Printograph Inc. (Office)

(Street Address) 7605 N San Fernando Rd

(City) Burbank, CA 91505

Description of Item (s): File Cabinet C = white binder of personal real estate documents and other misc. documents, personal and business tax returns prepared by Scan Takec.

Received By: 
(Signature)

Received From: 
(Signature)

Printed Name/Title: SA Patrick Fodess
Printed Name/Title: 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: 318A-LA-2947290

On (date) 7/2/2018

item(s) listed below were:

Collected/Seized
 Received From
 Returned To
 Released To

(Name) Photograph Inc (office)

(Street Address) 7605 N San Fernando Rd

(City) Burbank, CA 91505

Description of Item(s): File cabinet D: white binder
of real estate documents and invoice
addressed to Shodja Talace, tax returns
and correspondence prepared by Scan
Talace, business cards for Scan Talace,
hand-written notes and ledgers, donation
receipts and records, IRS correspondence.

Received By:

John Venuto
(Signature)

Received From:

(Signature)

Printed Name/Title:

John Venuto / Special Agent

Printed Name/Title:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: 318A-LA-2947290

On (date) 7/2/2018

item (s) listed below were:

Collected/Seized
 Received From
 Returned To
 Released To

(Name) Printograph, Inc. (Office)

(Street Address) 7605 N San Fernando Road

(City) Burbank, CA

Description of Item (s): Desk F

White binder containing personal financial information

John Hancock Retirement Information

Blank 1040-ES Payment Vouchers 2018

Department of Treasury Mailing Labels

Franchise Tax Board Mailing Labels

CK

Received By: Carlene Kikugawa
(Signature)

Received From: _____
(Signature)

Printed Name/Title: Carlene Kikugawa / FoA

Printed Name/Title: _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: 318 A - LA - 2947290On (date) 7/2/2018

item(s) listed below were:

Collected/Seized
 Received From
 Returned To
 Released To

(Name) Printograph, Inc (Office)(Street Address) 2605 N San Fernando Road(City) Burbank, CADescription of Item(s): Desk F3.0 USB Drive~~CK~~Received By: Carlene Kikugawa
(Signature)Received From: _____
(Signature)Printed Name/Title: Carlene Kikugawa, FOT Printed Name/Title: _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: 3:18 A-LA-2947290

On (date) 7/12/2018

item (s) listed below were:

Collected/Seized
 Received From
 Returned To
 Released To

(Name) Printograph, Inc (Office)

(Street Address) 7605 N San Fernando Road

(City) Burbank, CA

Description of Item (s): Bookshelf E

Maroon binder Containing information for
4611 Placidia Ave, Toluca Lake, CA, including
remodeling

White binder containing IRS correspondence;
Merrill Lynch reports

White box & other information for Ron Vance,
including tax returns signed by Sean Talaee

CK

Received By: Carlene Kitugawa
(Signature)

Received From: _____
(Signature)

Printed Name/Title: Carlene Kitugawa, FoA
Printed Name/Title: _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: 318A-LA-2947290

On (date) 7/2/2018

item (s) listed below were:

- Collected/Seized
- Received From
- Returned To
- Released To

(Name) Photograph Inc. (Office)

(Street Address) 7605 N. San Fernando Road

(City) Burbank, CA

Description of Item (s): Donation Receipts Breaking the Poverty cycle; Western Diocese of the Armenian church; Envelope Addressed to Mr. Anthony Druliner containing tax returns. Envelopes Addressed from A. Druliner to PTB & CA Dept of Revenue, & IRS containing tax returns signed by Talare; Financial accounts for Talare from B.A, Vanguard, Merrill Lynch, Tax Returns, Insurance, and Misc. Financial accounts

Received By: John Verrastro Received From: _____
(Signature) _____ (Signature) _____

Printed Name/Title: John Verrastro/Spec. Agent Printed Name/Title: _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID: 318A-LA-2947290On (date) 7/2/2018


item (s) listed below were:

Collected/Seized
 Received From
 Returned To
 Released To

(Name) Paratograph Inc. (Office)(Street Address) 7605 N San Fernando Rd(City) Burbank, CA 91505


Description of Item (s): Boxes on office floor adjacent to file cabinet D: Letter from Capitol One to Sean E Talace, Envelope of tax documents from Ron Vance Custom Projects to Sean Talace, Envelope of tslakstone Real Estate Income Trust offering materials.

Received By:



(Signature)

Received From:



(Signature)

Printed Name/Title:

SA Patrick Feder

Printed Name/Title:



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

date of transcription 7/10/2018

Kiosk Name: LACART LMK
 Kiosk ID: 7e61e43b-4bd8-402f-b41d-096ecaa07850
 Kiosk Location: Los Angeles
 Examiner Name: John Verrastro
 User Name: FBI User
 Field Office and Squad: LA - Los Angeles WCC2
 Case Type: 318
 Case Number: 318A-LA-2947290
 Exhibit Number:
 Other Case Information: USB 3.0 Thumb Drive

identifier_file name	md5 hash	category	file path
1_JAC CC Advances.xls	aa101710a46c2a57369e773b13848130	Data	\Jude\Desktop\JAC CC Advances.xls
2_Book1.xls	f99c0883128d998c488b307680368a70	Data	\Jude\Documents\Recipes\Book1.xls
3_STF43.pdf	ff95eb6919c6552dfdacf3d0121cd1fc	Text	\STF\STF43.pdf
4_STF42.pdf	c17b8ef29fd74afe35723e5006af58d4	Text	\STF\STF42.pdf
5_STF41.pdf	27e1013256b21b7021115d356c611f66	Text	\STF\STF41.pdf
6_STF40.pdf	7260339cbf73e0bb4b4e2dba3121696d	Text	\STF\STF40.pdf
7_STF39.pdf	6b50e4abaf642908efd51bf865f663b4	Text	\STF\STF39.pdf
8_STF38.pdf	8b041e1ad00bc6519ade3b5bfa50bd81	Text	\STF\STF38.pdf
9_STF37.pdf	3521ec747622ca7ef0c642938f6a683e	Text	\STF\STF37.pdf
10_STF36.pdf	a6f3021b67e309cf968a581c824a2b69	Text	\STF\STF36.pdf
11_STF35.pdf	5cea29f825b6dada5a2b893f77f3cb3e	Text	\STF\STF35.pdf
12_STF34.pdf	f0954f84bf78d059b779ee44e43806f4	Text	\STF\STF34.pdf
13_STF33.pdf	b719e893a4ad43e95d7a5fd0d4b237f	Text	\STF\STF33.pdf
14_STF32.pdf	66556c6c6824264e1a279a74ace3cac6	Text	\STF\STF32.pdf
15_STF31.pdf	4a454e2ea3b2a146191018c1be5f9f32	Text	\STF\STF31.pdf
16_STF30.pdf	f51eddb4072ecde7c8d508ea5bc9f42f	Text	\STF\STF30.pdf
17_STF29.pdf	20504ebc801f93cb8b8b64c06f2e64b	Text	\STF\STF29.pdf
18_STF28.pdf	13f883e006c3178db7280b2d7a3303f5	Text	\STF\STF28.pdf
19_STF27.pdf	72954fc62a2d1426bef220cbc3029f90	Text	\STF\STF27.pdf
20_STF26.pdf	2a9b9f16251cad6c52519f55013850fa	Text	\STF\STF26.pdf
21_STF25.pdf	f19488b6eae2ea4c26de4dd173f83f9e	Text	\STF\STF25.pdf
22_STF24.pdf	79301190a1ff5fc5303fb113dbb8cf4	Text	\STF\STF24.pdf
23_STF23.pdf	bf98570e9f1de002754503b2e2b119d7	Text	\STF\STF23.pdf
24_STF22.pdf	2ed6460a862392395bb4dc720fe68e48	Text	\STF\STF22.pdf
25_STF21.pdf	a9029aeeff5f13446b1be1e49a3218fb9	Text	\STF\STF21.pdf
26_STF20.pdf	ed3f42c72bdbd52fdd6c1aeb10b1e4c7	Text	\STF\STF20.pdf
27_STF19.pdf	d2fdb8094594cdf740758e9f932bb97	Text	\STF\STF19.pdf
28_STF18.pdf	97bf60b26ed949dfa31b8c4100c895bc	Text	\STF\STF18.pdf
29_STF17.pdf	c0da8ad27c4d83895d95afc3bf280da3	Text	\STF\STF17.pdf
30_STF16.pdf	50c4fe17394c7ef7a6ac66140fd20684	Text	\STF\STF16.pdf

identifier_file name	md5 hash	category	file path
31_STF15.pdf	81ff9645466161b8708640d15d829f44	Text	\STF\STF15.pdf
32_STF14.pdf	7535dde8d8029027a57043c7e6641569	Text	\STF\STF14.pdf
33_STF13.pdf	e319c6fa868035d52eacb1d4e28eb1fa	Text	\STF\STF13.pdf
34_STF12.pdf	3bb7545487ce079a992010ea5888557e	Text	\STF\STF12.pdf
35_STF11.pdf	b6ec886ceed55c2762820cd003223ee4	Text	\STF\STF11.pdf
36_STF10.pdf	e72ab43b12e2cb889babb35800a52b4c	Text	\STF\STF10.pdf
37_STF9.pdf	97d0d8f15e315cd797371fc827559e3a	Text	\STF\STF9.pdf
38_STF8.pdf	0b47d53fdfcf6d64fd4e79f01a0e04b6	Text	\STF\STF8.pdf
39_STF7.pdf	766de9f67b646891ed31ec2ce0b0ba1e	Text	\STF\STF7.pdf
40_STF6.pdf	cd3e5e8a607c12f0f581f7b8baeeb12c	Text	\STF\STF6.pdf
41_STF5.pdf	c11ffb87ff63e46f34bf49c7652f06cd	Text	\STF\STF5.pdf
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43_STF3.pdf	3b93d52ab792e916a95c2154dca915b9	Text	\STF\STF3.pdf
44_STF2.pdf	41c90fce74d3e60493b2ebbf9d892d93	Text	\STF\STF2.pdf
45_STF1.pdf	990d22d7881ce66e151d232cea9c4f89	Text	\STF\STF1.pdf
46_547076184.pdf	3bac1c8853b0330ff1ef70b8d9b5d926	Text	\Jude\Downloads\547076184.pdf
47_SET Nationwide.pdf	1f4e8137c2288e986d8d8d6993552b69	Text	\Jude\Desktop\SET Nationwide.pdf
48_ST Thank You.doc	ecf7b18d11e804a2942c46f21dcabde9	Text	\Jude\Desktop\ST Thank You.doc
49_The Talaee Tax Group.doc	f3364b414fc911ce2c1c22dde4bcd70	Text	\Jude\Desktop\The Talaee Tax Group.doc
50_Offer PP.doc	e7957a89f600949a952a6bebdd53bffa	Text	\Jude\Documents\Offer PP.doc
51_4611 Placidia Arch Struct Civil.pdf	af868b5b9bb0228694c6e972da1ac28e	Text	\Jude\Dropbox\4611 Placidia\4611 Placidia Arch Struct Civil.pdf
52_4611 Placidia Landscape.pdf	bf2b0c4e27cba2dbf228f2671636b6b3	Text	\Jude\Dropbox\4611 Placidia\4611 Placidia Landscape.pdf
53_4611 Placidia Soils Report 07-07-2017.pdf	a6f708e8522aa6d5abdc80cdf708ddd9	Text	\Jude\Dropbox\4611 Placidia\4611 Placidia Soils Report 07-07-2017.pdf
54_Soils Approval Letter.pdf	a5afc26b6f2b16009ae6023ec56cf3cc	Text	\Jude\Dropbox\4611 Placidia\Soils Approval Letter.pdf

Investigation on _____ at _____
 File # _____ Date dictated _____
 by _____

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